















U'.S. Banks' Exposure to Developing
Countries: An Examination ofRecent Trends
The Practice of Monetary Targeting:
A Case Study of the West German Experience
Changes in Bank Risk-TakingMonetary Targeting:
the West German Experience
h ".,..... ".,.1- Trehan
Economist, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco.
Editorial committee members were Reuven Glick, Fred
Furlong and Ramon Moreno.
Since the Bundesbank targeting in
it has used two target variables - Central Bank
Money and M3. Wefind both choices to havetheproperties
required monetary target. However, the Bundesbank
has not adhered strictly to its targets, retaining consider-
able discretion in its implementation ofmonetary target-
Changes in the dollar-deutschemark
exchange rate have a significant impact on where the
target variable ends up relative to the pre-announced
range.
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Rising inflation over the 1970s led to the adoption of
monetary targets as a guide to in a
number of industrialized countries. The West '-''-,' H ...n
Central Bank (the Bundesbank) was the first central bank
to announce a target money Since the
rates of inflation that haveprevailed inWest have
been lowerthan those in most other industrializednations.
This paper examines the extent to which the Bundesbank
has relied upon monetary targets to keep inflation under
control as well as to achieve its other policy objectives.
Our analysis focuses upon two key questions. We ask
whether the WestGerman central bank's choice of a target
variable has the properties required of such an aggregate.
This question is especially interesting because from 1975
to 1987 the Bundesbank targeted a rather unusual mone-
tary aggregate called Central Bank Money (CBM), which
is a weighted average of the components of the broad
monetary aggregate M3. Thus, we ask whether a stable
relationship exists between CBM and key macroeconomic
variables such asoutput, interest rates, and the price level.
Our answer is yes.
We ask the same question for M3, which is the aggre-
gate that the Bundesbank has announced it will target over
1988. Once again, the data is consistent with the existence
of a stable relationship between key macroeconomic vari-
ables and this aggregate. In fact, the data suggests that
CBM and M3 are rather similar.
We then look at the performance of the Bundesbank
since the time that it began to target CBM. Despite the
Bundesbank's success in keeping inflation low, itturns out
that the Bundesbank's target variable has been outside the
pre-announced range nearly as often as it has been within
it. Furthermore, movements in the dollar-deutschemark
exchange rate appear to be an important determinant of
where the Central Bank Money Stock ends up relative to
its target range. Clearly, the Bundesbank retains a consid-
erable amount of discretion in its implementation of
policy.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section I
presents a brief description of the institutional environ-
ment in which the Bundesbank operates. Section II
describes the Bank'soriginal target variable, CBM, as well
asthe factors that led to itschoice. SectionIII continues the
examination of CBM in a more formal way and also
examines the properties of the more conventional mone-
tary aggregates M1, M2, and M3.
Economic Review / Spring 1988Section IV looks at the conduct of monetary policy
since the Bundesbankfirst announced a monetary target in
1975. It contains a brief description of the economic
developments and some statistical analysis of the factors
that have influenced monetary policy in the interim. A
more detailed description of West German monetary pol-
icy since 1975 is presented in the Appendix. Section V
presents the conclusions and discusses the implications of
our analysis for the United States.
I. The Bundesbank and its Monetary Policy Objectives
The organization of the Bundesbank is similarto that of
the Federal Reserve. The Central Bank Council is the
policymaking body of the bank and is composed of the
members of the directorate and the presidents of theeleven
land central (that is, regional) banks. The directorate is the
central executive organ, whose members arenominated by
the federal government and appointed by the president of
Germany after consultation with the Central Bank
Council. I
The Bundesbank Act of 1957 emphasizes the Bank's
role in ensuring the stability of the currency, which has
been interpreted to include both a stable price level and a
stable foreign exchange value for the deutschemark.
The Act allows the Central Bank a considerable degree
of autonomy. While the Bundesbank is required to support
the generaleconomic policy of the government, it does not
have to do so if such support were to threaten the stability
of the currency. Members of the federal government are
allowed to attend the policy deliberations of the Bun-
desbank. While they cannot vote, they can place items on
the agendaand suggestthat apolicydecisionbe postponed
for two weeks.
n. Choosing an Intermediate Target
Twocriteria govern the choice of an intermediate target
variable. The first is that the target variable be controllable
by the central bank given the available instruments. The
second is that its control should lead to stable and predict-
able effects on the economy.
The monetary aggregate called Central Bank Money
(CBM) is a weighted average of the components of the
broad monetary aggregate, M3. Currency is included and
receives a weight of 1. The weights are .166 for demand
deposits, .124 for savings deposits, and .081 for time
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Economic Review / Spring 1988 31deposits. The weights on the various deposit accounts are
actually the reserve requirements that were in effect in
January 1974 and the weights have remained unchanged
since then (although the actual reserve requirements have
varied over time). CBM differs somewhat from the mone-
tary base since it excludes excess reserves and includes
only residents' holdings of deposit accounts. To under-
stand why the Bank chose to target CBM rather than a
more conventional aggregate, such as M1 or M2, it is
useful to examine the circumstances leading up to its
choice.
Prior to 1973, the Bundesbank paid close attention to
"free liquid reserves," which consisted of excess reserves
of commercial banks, short-term foreign assets, and
unused rediscount quotas. However, the relationship
between this aggregate and bank lending weakened in the
early 1970s. In particular, bank lending continuedto grow
significantly even when free liquid reserves were close to
zero. Facedwith this shiftinbehavior, the Bundesbankwas
forced to find alternative aggregates.
M1 was not a particularly attractive candidate because
experience over the 1960s had shown that changes in
policy did not have predictable effects on MI. Further-
more, the decontrol of interest rates over the 1965-67
period led to an increase in the degree of substitution
between demand deposits and short-term deposits. As a
consequence, the Bundesbank began to look at a some-
what broader conceptof the money stock consisting of M1
plus time deposits of less than six months maturity. Under-
lying this step was the belief that demand deposits and
short-term deposits had become close substitutes due to
interest rate decontrol. This aggregate was later modified
by including time deposits with maturities up to 3 months
only, and was called MIa.
Unfortunately, sharp interest rate movements in the
early 1970sdemonstrated that MIawasan unstable indica-
tor. For one thing, it turned out to have a positive interest
rate elasticity. Consequently, a broader aggregate called
M2 was introduced that contained MI plus time deposits
of up to 4 years maturity.2
However, MI and M2 often moved in opposite direc-
tions, making itdifficult to interpretwhat their movements
really meant. Chart I illustrates that the high degree of
substitution between M1 and M2 has continued over time.
There is general agreement that these deposit swings are
interest rate-induced. However, the problem for monetary
policy has been the difficulty of predicting the extent of
these movements.
Another margin of substitution that came to light as a
result of the sharp interest rate swings of the early 1970s
was that between savings and time deposits. As a conse-
quence, the monetary authorities defined a new aggregate
called M3 which consisted of M2 plus savings deposits.
Although M3 was perceived to internalize the deposit
shifts plaguing M1 and M2, the Bundesbank chose not to
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savings deposits would exaggerate the "moneyness" of
the latter two.3
Thus, the choiceof CBM was motivatedby the Bundes-
bank's beliefthat none ofthe existingmonetary aggregates
was likely to be useful as a target variable. Narrower
aggregates such as Ml and M2 were likely to be afflicted
by portfolio substitution, which would make it difficult to
interpret movements in them, and the broad aggregate M3
was too imprecise a measure of transactions balances. A
broad aggregate with more appropriate weights was, there-
fore, seen as the solution. This broad aggregate was
expectedto share some ofthecharacteristics ofM3 and, at
the same time, reflect movements in transactions aggre-
gates to a greater extent than M3.
The Bundesbank has mentioned this as the rationale for
choosing CBM on several occasions:
The various types of deposits within the minimum
reserve component ofthe central bank money stock
(that is, savings, time and demand deposits) are
consequently in a relation ofroughly 4:3:2 to each
other. This couldapproximate the varying degreesof
moneynessor liquidity which the different categories
ofdeposits are regarded as having,"
Chart 2 plots the growth fiites of Central Bank Money
and M3 for the period 1975-1986. The growth rates of the
two aggregates are close, suggesting that they do indeed
have similar characteristics. We tum now to an examina-
tion of the relationship between these aggregates and
various macroeconomic variables.
III. Analyzing the Monetary Aggregates
For an aggregate to be useful as a monetary target, there
shouldexist somesort of equilibriumrelationship between
it and macroeconomic variables such as output, the price
level, and the rateof interest. However, this requirement is
more properly imposed upon the long-run behavior of the
aggregate, since it would be unnecessarily stringent to
require that equilibrium exist in every single period.
Nevertheless the short-run behaviorof the aggregate is not
irrelevant. For policymakers, the usefulness of a long-run
relationship between a particular monetary aggregate and
key macroeconomic variables is likely to be severely
impaired if short-run movements in the aggregate are
largely uncorrelated with movements in those variables of
policy concern.
This section presents an analysis of the properties of
four alternative monetary aggregates - CBM, Ml, M2
and M3. We begin by examining the nature of long-run
movements in the various monetary aggregates and
whether these movements are related to long-run move-
ments in output, prices, and the interest rate. It turns out
that there is no stable, long-run relationship between
output, interest rates, and the real value of either Ml or
M2.
We then go on to estimate money demand functions for
the remaining two aggregates, CBM and M3. These
demand functions allow for adjustment towards long-run
equilibrium and also for the effects of short-runchanges in
the independent variables. The properties of the estimated
demand functions provide essential information about the
usefulness of these aggregates as target variables. For
instance, a significant interest rate elasticity implies that
the aggregate is subject to control through policy-induced
Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco
interest rate movements. In addition, a stable demand
function ensures that policy-induced variations in the
target variable would have predictable effects on the
economy.
Long-run Behavior
Recent work in econometrics has shown that it is
important to determine correctly the nature of the long-
term movements of a variable before attempting to carry
out any estimation. Specifically, it is necessary to deter-
mine whether random disturbances have permanent
effects on the level of the variable. A variable that exhibits
no tendency to return to its original value following a
disturbance it said to be nonstationary. Conversely, if the
effects of the randomdisturbance were to die out over time,
the variable would be said to be stationary. Ofcourse, the
variable still could be growing around a trend, in which
case the series is said to be trend-stationary.5
The point is that conventional econometric techniques
require stationarity. For example, if output, interest rates,
and the monetary aggregates were stationary, then we
could estimate money demand functions directly. Things
are not as straightforwardif some (or all) of these variables
were nonstationary. We return to these issues below.
Todetermine whetherthe variables that are of interestto
us are stationary (or trend-stationary, as the case may be),
we use the Dickey-Fuller test for unit roots, which is
described in Fuller (1976). The test consists of regressing
the first difference of the variable in question on its own
lagged level plus a constant, a time trend, and lagged first
differences as appropriate. The null hypothesis that the
33series contains a unit root (in other words, that random
disturbances permanently alter the level of the series)
implies that the coefficient on the lagged level should be
zero. The test statistic is just'the ratio of the estimated
coefficient to its standard error, except that under the nun
hypothesis this statistic does not have the usual t-distribu-
tion. Critical values for this statistic are tabulated in Fuller.
Table I presents the results of this test for the levels and
differences of the logs of real GNP, the real values of the
four monetary aggregates," and the interest rate variable
(which is the rate on three-month bank loans), The sample
period is 1975Ql to 1986Q4, In each case, we have
included two lags of the first difference of the dependent
variable to capturethe short-run dynamics. The first half of
the table shows that we cannot reject the hypothesis of
nonstationarity (or nontrend-stationarity, as the case may
be) at even the 10 percent level for any of the series. By
contrast, wecan reject the hypothesis of nonstationarity at
the 5 percent level for the first difference of all the series in
the table,
Our findings suggestthat the levels of all the variables in
question contain unit roots. A variable that contains a unit
root has no tendency to return to any value over
time (or to return to any trend for an
equilibrium relationship to exist between a particular
aggregate and variables such as output, interest rates, etc.,
the disturbances that cause nonstationary behavior in the
monetary aggregate must also influence the latter set of
variables. Ifthe in the does
arise from the same sources as the nonstationarity in
output, etc., the monetary aggregate will tend to drift away
from the other variables.
Recent developments in econometrics a means
of determining whether there is a long-run reranonsrup
between variables that contain unit roots. It turns out that
we can test for the existence of a long-run relationship
between such variables by estimating an ordinary least
squares regression and examining the residuals from this
regression for stationarity. A finding that the residuals are
stationary means that even though the variables included
34 Economic Review / Spring 1988in the regression are nonstationary, there exists a linear
combination of the variables that is stationary. Put dif-
ferently, the variables will not drift away from each other.
Such variables are said to be cointegrated. (See Granger
and Engle, 1987.)
Table 2 presents the results of regressing the logs of the
real values of each of the monetary aggregates on the logs
of real GNP and the interest rate. We present two alterna-
tive test statistics. The row labelled "Dickey-Fuller Test"
presents the results of the Dickey-Fuller test for sta-
tionarity of the residuals. As discussed, this test involves
regressing the first difference of the residual series from
the regression on its lagged level. The test statistic is the
ratio of the estimated coefficient to its standard error, as
before. The Durbin-Watson statistic for the original equa-
tion also can be used to test the hypothesis that the
variables arecointegrated, Ifthe variables were notcointe-
grated, the residuals would be nonstationary and the
Durbin-Watson statistic would be close to zero. Thus, the
null hypothesis of no cointegration (or alternatively, that
the residuals are nonstationary) would be rejected if the
Durbin-Watson statistic werelarge enough. Critical values
for both tests are reported in Engle and Yoo (1987). Note,
however, that the critical values of the Durbin-Watson
statistic reported there are forcointegration inthe bivariate
case only.?
The results in Table 2 show that we can reject the
hypothesis of no cointegration between CBM, real GNP,
and interest rates at the 5 percent level on the basis of the
Dickey-Fuller test. The Durbin-Watson statistic is also
reasonably large. The Dickey-Fullertest does not allow us
to reject the hypothesis of no cointegration between M3
and the other two variables at even the 10 percent level.
However, the Durbin-Watson statistic for this regression is
significant at the 10 percent level. For and M1, we
cannot reject the null of no cointegration on the basis of
either test.
Although none of the more conventional monetary
aggregates (Ml, M2 or M3) is cointegrated with income
and interest rates taken together, it is possible for them to
be cointegrated with income alone. The results of the tests
forcointegrationbetween each ofthese aggregates and real
GNP are presented in Table 3. We can reject the null
hypothesis of no cointegration between M3 and real GNP
at the 10percent significance levelusing eitherthe Dickey-
Fuller test or the Durbin-Watson statistic. However, we
cannot reject the null of no cointegration either between
MI and real GNP or between M2 and real GNP.
These results haveimportant implications for the choice
of target variable. Our evidence suggests that the real
values of both M1 and M2 are subject to random distur-
bances that permanently alter the levels of these aggre-
Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco 35gates but that do not have similar effects on either income
or interest rates. This makes it undesirable to use MI and
M2 for monetary targeting, since they exhibit no tendency
toward a stable relationship with key macroeconomic
variables. One implicationof this finding isthat ifa money
demand function were estimated for eitherof these aggre-
gates, the absence of an equilibrium relationship likely
would show up as permanent "shifts" in the estimated
function.
By contrast, our results show that permanent distur-
bances to the real value ofCBM are related to permanent
disturbances to output and interest rates. The finding that
CBM is cointegrated with real GNP and interest rates has
an intuitive interpretation. It implies that even though
these three series are subject to random disturbances that
have permanent effects, these disturbances are not inde-
pendent. Thus, long-run movements in the real value of
CBM will tend to be closelyassociatedwith movementsin
output and interest rates. We also find that permanent
disturbances to the real value of M3 are related to perma-
nent disturbances to output (although the evidence here is




The existence of a cointegrating regression is not suffi-
cient to ensure that either CBM or M3 will be useful as
monetary aggregates since it tells us only about long-run
relationships. We need to examine the behavior of these
two aggregates over the short-run as well. It is tempting to
do so by estimating money demand functions in the first
differences ofthe variables, since first differencing purges
the data of long-run movements. However, such a step is
inappropriate when the variables are cointegrated because
it means ignoring the long-run relationship that exists
between them.
The appropriate way to proceed is to estimate an error
correction model which forces gradual adjustment of the
dependent variable toward some long-run value while
explicitly allowing for short-run dynamics. 8 For example,
our finding of cointegration implies that the difference
between the actual value ofCBMand that suggestedby the
cointegrating regression will tend to move back towards
zero following a random disturbance. This suggests that
the discrepancy between the actual and equilibrium value
of CBM is likely to be one of the factors that determines
the growth ofCBM at any time. Of course, the growth rate
of CBM also is likely to be influenced by various tempo-
rary disturbances to the other variables in the regression.
These considerations suggest that the equation to be
estimated should be of the form:
CBMt = a + b, I a Real GNP t - i
1
+ Cj I a INTt j + d ECt J
i
where a denotes the first difference,
INT is the interest rate, and,
ECt = CBMt + 4.22 1.28RGNPt + O.02INTt
is the error-correction term.
The error-correction term is constructed using the
coefficients from the cointegrating regression shown in
Table 2. The first differenced terms capture the effects of
short-run disturbances to output and interest rates while
the error correction term captures the adjustment towards
long-run equilibrium. A similar equation is estimated for
M3, with the error-correction term obtained from the
cointegrating regression shown in Table 3.
The estimated demand functions for CBM and M3 are
shown in Table4. The functions werefirstestimatedwith 8
lags of both the firstdifference of real GNP and the interest
rate. Lags that were insignificant were then eliminated,
taking care that this did not induce residual autocorrela-
tion. The coefficient on the error-correction term in the
CBM equation reveals that approximately one-fourth of
Economic Review / Spring 1988the previous quarter's discrepancy between the actual and
equilibriumvalue ofCBM iscorrectedeach quarter. Short-
run movements in real GNP and interest rates also have a
significant impact on CBM growth.
The equation for M3 reveals that the previous period's
discrepancy between actual and equilibrium values is a
significant factor inexplainingM3 growth aswell. Further,
while there is no long-run relationship between M3 andthe
Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco
rate of interest, the growth rate of M3 is temporarily
affected by interest rate movements.
A Chow test was carried out to test the stability of each
of the estimated demand functions. The sample was
divided. into two subsamples, the first extending over
1975Ql-1979Q4 and the second extending over
I980Q1-1986Q4. The breakpoint was chosen on the basis
of the dollar-mark exchange rate: the dollarreached its low
point against the mark in 1979Q4 and began to appreciate
after that. For CBM, the computed value of the F(9,28)
statistic is 1.48, which has a marginal significance level of
.20. The computedvalue of the F(5,38)statistic forthe M3
equationwas0.68, which has a marginal significancelevel
of .64. 9 Thus, neither the demand function for M3 nor that
for CBM exhibits any evidence of instability over the
1975Ql-1986Q4 period.
To summarize, the evidence presented in this section
suggests that the real value of CBM has had a stable
relationship with real income and interest rates over the
periodthat the Bundesbank has been targeting CBM. Real
output and the real value of M3 also appear to be similarly
related. However, no stable, long-nm relationship exists
for either Ml or M2.
These results are consistent with the argument that the
narrower aggregates are subject torandomportfolio distur-
bances that prevent them from having a stable relationship
with output. These disturbances appear to be internalized
within the broader aggregate M3 to an extent that interest
rate fluctuations do not appear to have any long term
impact on it. The evidence also suggests that aggregate
CBM has characteristics more like those of the broad
monetary aggregate M3 than the relatively narrow aggre-
gates M1and M2. This implies that the weights attached to
savings and time deposits in CBM are sufficient to offset
the impact of portfolio disturbances that afflict M1and M2
and to ensure a stable relationship betweenreal output, the
interest rate, and the real value ofCBM. Thus, our analysis
suggests that both CBM and M3 possess the characteris-
tics required of a target variable. 10
We now tum to the second issue that is of interest,
namely, an examination of the actual conduct of policy
since the Bundesbank began to target CBM.
37IV. West German Monetary Policy since the mid-1970s
In this section, we examine West German monetary
policy since the Bundesbank began to target CBM in
1975. We begin by describing the factors that the Bun-
desbank takes into account in setting the target range each
year, and then look at how the CBM target has varied over
the years. Finally, we look at how successful the Bun-
desbank has been at achieving these ranges and the factors
that have played a role in determining where CBM ended
up relative to its target range.
By announcing aCBM for 1975, the Bundesbank
became the firstcentral bank to announce a money growth
target. In the beginning, the Bundesbank's discussion of a
desirable rate ofCBM growth wascouched in terms of the
expected growth of capacity, the desired change in capac-
ity utilization, and the expected development of the
"velocityofcirculation." 11 The Bundesbank also made an
allowance for the "unavoidable" rate of inflation, which
wasdefined as "pricerises which havealready entered into
decisions and arrangements in the economy." However,
the Bundesbank stopped using the term unavoidable in
1985, explaining that "Given the large measure of price
stability achieved, it would have been difficult to explain
credibly why this concept should be retained." 12
Recent discussions of the target range for CBM have
been cast in terms of the growth rate of the nominal
"productionpotential", which isfurther broken down into
the growth rate of real production potential and a "toler-
ated" rate of inflation. The rate of inflation that the Bank
allows for has been declining over time. For example, it
was between 4 to 5 percent in 1976, between 3.5 to 4
percent in 1981, and 2 percent in 1986. The Bundesbank
also retains the option of revising targets at mid-year, but
has not done so until now.
Table 5 presents the target ranges as well as actual
growth of CBM since 1975. The Bank announced single-
valued targets for the first four years, but (convinced
perhaps by the size of the errors) has been expressing its
targets as ranges since 1979. It is notable that the upper
bound of the target range decreased steadily from ahigh of
9 percent in 1979to 5 percent in 1985. However,it went up
by a half-percentage point in both 1986 and 1987. The
width of the range also was narrowed to 2 percentage
points beginning in the target year 1984, but was widened
back to 3 percentage points for 1987. We discuss the
significance of these changes below.
The Bundesbank's record in achieving its target ranges
has been mixed. CBM growth wasabove target from 1975
to 1978- the four years for which the target consistedof a
single number. However,for two of those years the discre-
pancy was only around one percentage point. CBM
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growth did not exceed the upper bound of its target range
for the next six years, actually ending up below the lower
bound in 1980and 1981. However, the target wasovershot
in both 1986 and 1987.
Anexaminationof the conductof monetary policy since
1975 provides interesting insights into how the Bun-
desbank reacts to different economic developments and
helps explain the Bank's record ofmonetary targeting. (A
description is contained in the Appendix.) It is quite
that the Bundesbank attaches a deal of
importance to price level stability. But rate
stability - especially the stability of the mark-dollar rate
- has always been an extremely important consideration.
While the exchange rate is important because Germany's
foreign trade comprises a significant proportion of its
GNP, the focus on the dollar is probably the result of the
fact that the mark is one of the most important reserve
currencies in the world after the dollar. Consequently, the
least sign of instability in the value of the dollar sets up
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2 = .65/.53; D.W. = 1.75; Rho = .58 (3.88)
From the test statistics, wecan reject the null hypothesis
that the coefficients on the current and lagged values of
real GNP growth are zero at the 5 percent level of signifi-
cance. However, the sum ofthe coefficients on real GNPis
.02, and has a marginal significance level of .84. The
coefficients on the inflation rate are significant at the 1
percent level, and their sum is .37, which also is
significant at the 1 percent level. We can reject the
hypothesis that the coefficients ofthe current and lagged
values of the exchangerate are zero at the 5 percentlevel of
significance. The sum of these coefficients is .03 and is
significantly different from zero at the 5 percent level as
well.
These results are consistent with ourearlier discussion.
The estimates suggest that the Bundesbank responds
immediately to changes in inflation. An increase in infla-
tion leads to a contemporaneous reduction in CBMgrowth
relative to the mid-point of its target range as well as a
reduction in CBM growth over the next quarter. When the
mark appreciates against the dollar, policymakers respond
by pushing CBM above the midpoint of its target range.
However, this response is slower than the response to
inflation. Finally, the measured response to GNPis ambig-
uous. Thus, the Bundesbankapparentlyattaches the great-
est importance to the rate of inflation and to stabilizing the
exchange rate. IS
We have examined how the Bundesbank sets its mone-
tary targets and how successful it has been in attaining
these targets. We saw that the target is missed fairly often,
and that large misses are associated with variations in the
dollar-mark exchange rate. These casual observations are
supported by the results from the estimated reaction
function.
speculative movements in the mark. In addition, a signifi-
cant amount of world trade is invoiced in dollars.
The strong correlationbetween movements in the mark-
dollar rate and how well the Bundesbank performed rela-
tive to its target range, in fact, allows us to divide the
period under review into three sub-periods. The first
covers the years immediately following the adoptionofthe
CBM target, that is, approximately 1975 to 1979. The
dollar tended to depreciate over this period and the Bun-
desbank generally allowed CBM to exceed its target.
The mark fell relative to the dollar over the first halfof
the 1980s. Over that period, CBM ended the year below
the lower boundof its target range twiceand was below the
midpoint once. It never ended the year above the upper
bound of its target range.
The last two years or so constitute the final sub-period,
where the mark has been appreciating against the dollar
again. And in both 1986 and 1987, CBM has grown above
the target range. Thus, the target has been exceeded
despite the fact that the Bundesbank increased the upper
boundof the target range halfa percentagepointeach year.
This is not to say that the Bundesbank cares only about
stabilizing the exchange rate. As mentioned above (and
described in the Appendix), the Bank is extremely con-
cernedabout price level stability. And the Bundesbank has
from time to time, adjusted its policy stance to take the
level of real activity directly into account. Toobtain amore
accurate idea of the importance that the Bundesbank
attaches to various objectives, a monetary policy reaction
function was estimated for the years 1975-1986.
The reaction function was estimated in terms of the
deviation of CBM from the midpoint of the announced
target path.t' This variable - denoted by CBMDEV
below - is preferable to using (either the level or the
growth rate of) CBM directly, since using CBM mayresult
in confounding the demandfunction for the aggregate with
the Bundesbank's reaction function. The explanatory vari-
ables in the regression are the growth rate of real GNP
(RGNP), the rate of inflation (GNPDEF), and the growth
rate of the deutschemark-dollar exchange rate
(DM$RATE), which is expressed in dollars per mark. 14
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its monetary target in pursuit ofexchange rate stability has
not called into question its commitment to price level
stability. This appears to be the result of the relatively low
rates of inflation that haveprevailed in WestGermany over
the period. For example, Germany's GNP deflator
increased by approximately 3 percent over 1986, after
increases of approximately 2 percent over each of the
previous two years. While the rate of inflation did go up
following the 1979 oil price increase, the highest annual
increase in the GNP deflator recorded since 1979 was the
4.8 percent inflation rate during 1981. 16 These relatively
low rates of inflation imply that the Bundesbank's practice
of giving up on its monetary target to focus on stabilizing
the deutschemark has not imposed large costs in terms of
price level stability. As a consequence, the Bank's anti-
inflation stance remains credible.
v. Conclusions
This paper has focused on two aspects of the process of
monetary targeting in Germany since 1975. The first
concerns the choice of a target variable. Our results
suggest that CBM has characteristics similar to the broad
aggregate M3, and that neither is susceptible to the port-
folio disturbances afflicting Ml and M2. We found evi-
dence that the real value of CBM is cointegrated with real
output and interest rates and (weaker evidence) that M3 is
cointegrated with output. Cointegration between these
variables allowed us to employ an error-correction specifi-
cation to estimate demand functions for CBM and M3.
These demand functions were robust to a simple test for
nonstability. These results imply that both CBM and M3
satisfy the requirements for a target variable.
The finding regarding the nature ofCBMhas potentially
important implications for the U.S. as well. Until recently,
U.S. monetary policy has placed the most emphasis on the
narrow monetary aggregate, MI. However,the behaviorof
Ml over the past few years has been largely at odds with
the behavior of output and inflation. In fact, U.S. policy-
makers today are faced with a dilemma that is similar to
that faced by West German policymakers during the
mid-1970s. The policy of targeting the narrow aggregate
Ml has been rendered infeasible by the increased sub-
stitutability between various types of deposit accounts
both inside and outside MI. 17 While the broad aggregates
M2 and M3do not appear tohavebeen as susceptibleto the
random portfolio disturbances that have afflicted Ml in
recent years, movements in them are not likely to be
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closely related to movements in macroeconomic variables
that are of interest to policymakers. As such, it may be
useful to examine the relationship between output, infla-
tion, and some aggregate similar to the West German
Central Bank Money Stock with a view to obtaining a
more suitable monetary target.
The second part of the paper examined the conduct of
monetary policy in Germany since the Bundesbank began
to target a monetary aggregate. The Bundesbank
obviously places a great deal of emphasis on inflation.
This is reflected in the estimated reaction function. It is
also evident in the low rates of inflation in Germany over
this period, rates that clearly have been lower than those
that prevailed in most industrialized nations.
Germany's concern over inflation has not bound it to
strict adherence to monetary targets, since the target has
been missed frequently. Our finding of a stable CBM
demand function suggests that the deviations from target
are not due to "shifts" in the demand for CBM. Instead,
the deviations demonstrate that the Bundesbank has
retained a considerable level of discretion in the imple-
mentation of monetary targeting. Our examination of
episodes ofdeviation from target shows that fluctuations in
the exchange rate werea major determinantof where CBM
ended up relative to its target. This practice has not had
adverse effects on inflation because the Bundesbank has
reacted symmetrically to increases and decreases in the
value of the mark - easing when the mark tended to
appreciate and tightening when it tended to depreciate.
Economic Review / Spring 1988APPENDIX
German Monetary Policy Since 1975
To provide greater insight into the discussion and con-
clusions in Section III, this appendix provides a brief
description of German monetary policy since the Bundes-
bank began to target CBM.*
December 1974-December 1975
Monetary policy relaxed substantially in 1975, the first
year that a target was announced. Real GNP had begun to
contract in mid-l974 and fell by approximately 5 percent
over the next four quarters. The Bundesbank's tendency to
ease was reinforced early in the year by the falling dollar,
which felltothe then-postwarlowof2.28marks inMarch.
When economic activity showed no sign of picking up by
mid-1975, the Bundesbankeased policy evenfurther. The
discount rate stood at 3Yz percent in September- half the
level in September 1974.**
The monetary easing had the expected impact on CBM
growth. The level of CBM in December 1975 was 10
percent above that in December 1974, or 2 percent above
target. The Bundesbankresponded to this overshooting by
redefining the target year. The CBM target growth rate
would henceforth be measured on a year-over-yearbasis,
instead of December-over-December. The justification for
dropping the old method wasthat itexaggerated therole of
temporary factors. The targeted growth rate of CBM was
set at 8 percent for 1976.
1976-1977
The economy rebounded over the next couple of years,
while the rate of inflation declined. Domestic demand
grew strongly in 1976 and real GNP increased by around
5.5 percent. The rate of inflation fell to 4 percent per year.
Real GNP grew at a 2.5 percent rate the following year
although unemployment did not fall much. Although the
cost of living index for 1977 was 3.9 percent above 1976
levels, inflation was clearly slowing down over the course
ofthe year.
The dollar, after recovering over mid-1975 and staying
relatively stable over the first half of 1976, started falling
against the mark in the second half. It fell throughout
1977, with the rate of depreciation accelerating consider-
ably after October. On March 1, 1978 the dollar stood at
1.99 marks, having fallen 19 percent over the previous 14
months. The Bundesbank eased substantially over 1977,
causing CBM to grow rapidly. CBM grew at a 12 percent
annual rate over the second half of the year, but the 9
percent rate of growth for the year as a whole was just 1
percent above the target.
1978
The depreciating dollar was perhaps the most important
reason behind the Bundesbank's maintaining its easy
policy stance over 1978. Real GNP grew by 3.5 percent
over the year and the rate of unemployment fell to 3.7
percent. Thus, the level of domestic activity suggested no
need to ease. However, the mark was appreciating signifi-
cantly against the dollar, so that by October 1978, the
dollar stood at 1.78 marks. The attempt to stabilize the
mark caused policy to remain accommodative, with the
discount rate held at 3 percent over the year. This stance
was facilitated by a still-declining rate of inflation - the
2.6 percent increase in consumerprices over 1978 was the
lowest since the end of the 1960s. Easy policy did lead to a
surge in CBM growth, with CBM growing 11percentover
the year, while the target rate was 8 percent.
The size of the miss appears to havebeen responsible for
a redefinition of the target year once again, as the Bun-
desbank decided to target CBM growth on a fourth quarter
over fourth quarter basis from the following year.
1979
The dollar-mark exchange rate wasrelatively stable over
1979. Accordingly, the Bundesbank focused on domestic
conditions. Inflation was picking up gradually: while the
cost of living index in 1979 was just 4.1 percent above
1978, its value in December 1979 was approximately 5.5
percent above year-ago levels. Economic activity was
strong, with real GNP rising at a 4.5 percent rate and the
unemployment rate averaging 3.3 percent.
The Bundesbank therefore tightened policy. The dis-
count rate wasraised to4percentin March and to5percent
in July. CBM remained above target till May. At mid-year
* This description is not meantto be exhaustive. Fora detaileddiscussion. see various issues ofthe GEeD'sEconomic Surveys on Germanyandthe
Bundesbank's Annual Reports.
** In Germany, the discount rate is not a penalty rate as it is in the U.S. Instead it is the rate at which commercial banks borrow against rediscount
quotas established by the Bundesbank. For a description ofpolicy instruments and operating procedures, see Deutsche Bundesbank (1982).
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target range and policy was tightened further over the
second half of 1979.
1980
A depreciating mark and rising inflation came together
to determine the tight monetary policy stance that pre-
vailed over 1980. Consumer prices were approximately
5Y2 percent above 1979 levels, while the mark fell by
around 13 percent against the dollar. Although real GNP
grew nearly 2 over the year, this
almost entirely in the first quarter, with output actually
declining over the second halfof the year. In February, the
Bundesbank announced that it would keep CBM around
the middle or perhaps in the lower halfof its target range.
Attempts to revive CBM growth, and thereby to increase
real activity, during the summer were dropped when the
mark began to depreciate. Signalling a continuation of-its
tight monetary policy stance, the Bundesbank reduced the
target range for the next year by 1 percent.
1981
1981 was a year of contracting output and rising infla-
tion. Real GNP fell 0.3 percent over the year, while the
costofliving index rose by nearly 6 percent. The markfell
sharply against the dollar early in the year. By mid-
February, it had fallen by aboutas much again as it did over
all of 1980.
The Bundesbank reacted with a severe tightening of
policy. The mark recovered in response and began to
appreciate against the dollar in the latter half of the year.
As a consequence, interest rates began to decline in late
1981. CBM growth was on target until mid-year but then
slowedand actuallydeclinedfor a whiletowards the end of
the year.
1982
The worldwide recession in 1982 and the consequent
decrease in German exports combined with stagnant
domestic demand to cause a decline in real GNP of over
1.5 percent, while the unemployment rate rose from 5 to
6.5 percent. Although consumer prices increased by 5.3
percent during 1982, the pace of inflation was clearly
slowing over the year. When the mark stabilized in early
1982, the Bank announced that CBM growth around the
middle or in the upper half of the target range would be
acceptable.
Monetary easing paused at mid-year as the mark fell
against the dollar again. However, the worldwide reduc-
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tion in interest rates towards the end of the year allowed
German monetary authorities to ease domestic rates. The
discount rate stood at 5 percent in December.
1983
The markwas relatively stable in early 1983 and the rate
of inflation declined, allowing policymakers to focus on
output growth. The Bundesbank indicated under
these conditions, it would allow CBM growth in the upper
half of its 4-7 percent target range over the year. Policy
remained easy in the but the mark's deprecia-
tion laterin the year led to a of
the unemployment rate went up during 1983, the rate of
output growth picked up over the course of the year. Real
GNP increased by 1.5 percent over the year as a whole
the first increase since 1980.
1984
Real GNP grew by 2.5 percent in 1984, despite severe
production losses due to strikes. Strong foreign demand
contributed significantly to this increase. However, the
unemployment rate stayed at 8.1percent of the total labor
force. Inflationcontinuedon its downwardtrend as the cost
of living index rose 2.4 percentcompared to 3.3 percent in
1983. However, the mark fell by approximately 13.5
percent against the dollar over 1984, and this fall appears
to have been largely responsible for halting the downward
drift in interest rates.
1985
Interestrates actually increased around the time that the
dollar peaked in February 1985. But the decrease in U.S.
interest rates that followed triggered a marked decline in
German interest rates as well. The upswing in real activity
continued, with output growing at a 2.5 percent rate.
Inflation slowed down further, with consumer prices
increasing at a 2.2 percent rate over the year.
The upper bound of the CBM target range for 1984 had
already been lowered to 6 percent on the grounds that the
level ofuncertainty about the economic environment had
gone down. For 1985, the Bundesbankcitedthe prevailing
low levels of inflation as the reason for lowering both the
upper and lower bounds of the target range by I percent.
1986
The target range for 1986 was increased by half a
percentage point on the grounds that the potential real
output growth rate had increased. Prices were stable over
the year, with some indices actually declining. Monetary
Economic Review / Spring 1988policy was dominated by the exchange rate again. The
mark continued to appreciate against the dollar, and the
Bundesbank responded with an accommodative policy.
The discount rate was cut to 3.5 percent in March.
The accommodative policy stance was continued even
when clear signs that CBM was overshooting its target
emerged at mid-year. Thus, CBM growth for the 1986
target year was 7.7 percent, or more than 2 percentage
above the upper bound of the target range.
Uncertainty over the future course of exchange rates
("special uncertainties" in the Bundesbank's language)
to a widening of the 1987 target range by 1percentage
point.
Realoutput increased by 2.5 percentin 1986due largely
to an increase in consumption. However, growth began to
slow from the middle of 1986, with production stagnating
Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco
in the last quarter of 1986 and declining in the early
months of 1987. The rapid deterioration was a surprise,
being a consequence of sluggish exports and sharply
increased import penetration. The volume of exports fell
for only the third time in post-war history.
1987 on
Available data suggest that monetary policy continued
to focus on the exchange rate over 1987. CBM grew 8.1
percent from the fourth quarter of 1986 to the fourth
rm"rtp,. of 1987, 2.1 above the 3
target range. In 1988, the Bundesbankannounced
a 3-6 percent range for M3, citing the relatively large
impact of (difficult to explain) currency movements on
CBM as the reason for dropping that aggregate.
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1. Willms (1983) points out thatthe role played by the Central
Bank Council in appointing new members has diminished
over time, and that some members were appointed over the
Central Bank's objections.
2. The West Germany definition of M2 is thus different from
the U.S. definition. In the U.S., M2 contains M1, savings
deposits, Money Market Deposit Accounts, Small Time
Deposits (that is, time deposits containing up to $100,000),
and some money market mutual funds.
3. See the discussion on pp. 71-82 of Deutsche
Bundesbank, Special Series NO.7.
4. Deutsche Bundesbank, Special Series No.7, p. 78.
5. Technically, we will be concerned with the existence of a
"unit root." The simplest example of a process that contains a
unit root is given by
Yt=Yt-1 +ut
where u,is a stationary disturbance term. Such a process is
called a random walk. This is a special case of a nonstation-
ary process. For instance, the process
Yt = 2Yt_1 +u,
is nonstationary although it does not contain a unit root.
6. We look at the real values of the monetary aggregates
because the objective is to estimate money demand func-
tions in real terms. The GNP deflator has been used to
convert nominal to real values.
7. Granger and Engle also present alternative tests for the
null of no cointegration. One of these is the Augmented
Dickey-Fuller test, which adds the lagged differences of the
residual asadditional right-hand-side variables to the regres-
sion used for the Dickey-Fuller test. The test statistic is the
same as before. Results of this test are not reported here
because the lagged differences of the residual were found to
be insignificant.
8. For an earlier example of the use of an error-correction
model to estimate a money demand function, see Hendry
(1980). See also Motley (1988).
9. Splitting the sample intotwo equal sub-samples also does
not suggest instability. For CBM, the computed F-statistic of
1.27 has a marginal significance level of .30. For M3, the
F-statistic is .53, and has a marginal significance level of .75.
10. Needless to say, the Bundesbank's choice of CBM asthe
target variable has not been free from criticism. See, for
example, Courakis (1980).
11. The following description is based on the discussions
contained in various issues of the Annual Report of the
Deutsche Bundesbank.
12. See the Bundesbank Annual Report for 1985.
13. Because the reaction function does nottake intoaccount
the factors that go into setting the target ranges themselves,
the results below are perhaps more appropriately interpreted
as measuring the Bundesbank's response to unanticipated
movements in output, the price level, and the exchange rate.
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14. Since the explanatory variables are in growth rates,
CBMDEV for a given quarter is actually measured as a
percentage of the target level of CBM for that quarter. The
estimated equation also contains a constant dummy for the
second quarter of 1978 that is not shown below.
15. It should be pointed out that concern about the
exchange rate ultimately does reflect concern about real
GNP.
16. Since Germany isnotan oil producer, the GNPdeflator is
not directly affected by oil prices. An alternative is to look at
the Consumer Price Index. This index increased by 6.8
percent in 1981. The average rate over 1979-81 was 5.9
percent, while that over 1983-85was 2.2 percent. The CPIfell
by 1.1 percent over 1986.
17. See Judd and Trehan (1987) for a discussion of the
recent changes in the behavior of various monetary aggre-
gates in the U.S.
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